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I. INTRODUCrION
When the Joneses come into your office, they are distraught. Their
house had been destroyed by fire some time ago, and they have been
having nothing but trouble with their insurance company. After filing
a claim with XYZ Insurers, they had been called into the agent's office
for a two and one-half hour session of interrogation that included such
questions as, "How did you start the fire?" XYZ refused to pay shelter
and living expense benefits, even conditionally. Months after the fire,
XYZ demanded that the Joneses submit to another examination, submit
a sworn statement, and take a polygraph test. The Joneses became afraid
of an accusation or even a prosecution for an arson they had not com-
mitted. They were in what the insurance industry calls a "favorable
attitude" for settlement. They did settle, for thirty cents on the dollar.
They want to know what you can do to help, and you agree to look
into the matter.
You write to the XYZ Insurers and in due course receive a copy of
the file, including the original statement taken at the first interview with
the Joneses. There are no questions suggestive of arson in that state-
ment-they have all been edited out. You investigate further. You dis-
cover that XYZ maintains a school for their agents to teach them how to
obtain the most "economically feasible" settlement. The agent who dealt
1
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with the Joneses is a graduate of that school. You discover that XYZ
advertises to prospective clients that XYZ will take care of its clients;
the brochure which influenced the Joneses to insure with XYZ contained
the bold print claim: "Protect yourself from the ruin and disastrous con-
sequences of fires and other casualties. We do the worrying for you."
, In fact, the XYZ company had only aggravated the worrying the
Joneses had done themselves. They had delayed the analysis of debris
which could have provided evidence of arson by sending the test out of
state instead of to the routinely used St. Louis laboratory, "and had re-
fused to settle any claim until it was returned. When received, the report
was used as leverage to deny the original claim even though it was so
inconclusive that such trifling items as grease on a shirt could result
in an indication of possible arson. This is, in essence, the description of
an actual case. The Joneses-and others like them-have been maltreated
by-their insurance company and seek a lawyer's help to redress their injury.
In Missouri, the Joneses are limited in their possible remedies for the
wrongful treatment they have received at the hands of XYZ.1 In Cali-
fornia, however,, and in a growing number of jurisdictions following its
trend, the Joneses can recover for their injuries, including mental dis-
1. Since an insurance policy is an ordinary contract, an action would lie
for damages resulting from its breach. Damages available would be those con-
tra&ed for, the face amount of the policy, or the amount of the loss if less than
the policy limits. Moss v. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 385 F. Supp. 1291 (W.D.
Mo. 1974). The Missouri vexatious refusal to pay statutes consist of two sections
in the insurance chapter of the revised statutes. RSMo § 375.296 (1978) provides:
, In any action, suit or other proceeding instituted against any in-
surance company, association or other insurer upon any contract on in-
surance issued or delivered in this state to a resident of this state, or to
,a: corporation incorporated in or authorized to do business in this state,
-if the insurer has failed or refused for a period of thirty days after due
demand therefor prior to the institution of the action, suit or proceeding,
to make payment under and in accordance with the terms and provisions
of the contract of insurance, and it shall -appear from the evidence that
.the refusal was vexatious and without reasonable cause, the court or jury
may, in addition to the amount due under the provisions of the con-
tract of insurance and interest thereon, allow the plaintiff damages for
-vexatious refusal to pay and attorney's fees as provided in section 375.420.'
Failure of an insurer to appear and defend any action, suit or other pro-
ceeding shall be deemed prima facie evidence that its failure to make
payment was vexatious without reasonable cause.
V.A:M.S. § 375.420 (Supp. 1979) provides:
Ir any action against any insurance company to recover the amount of
any loss under a policy of automobile, fire, cyclone, lightning, life,
health, accident, employers' liability, burglary, theft, embezzlement, fi-
"delity, indemnity, marine or other insurance except automobile liability
insurance, if it appears from the evidence that such company has re- -
fused to pay such loss without reasonable cause or excuse, the court or
jury may, in addition to the amount thereof and interest, allow the
plaintiff damages not to exceed twenty percent of the first fifteen'
hundred dollars of the loss, and ten percent of the amount of the loss
in excess of fifteen hundred dollars and a reasonable attorney's fee; and.
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tress occasioned by the delay in settlement and possibly punitive damages,
if they can prove the tort of "bad faith" by their insurer, XYZ.2 Missouri
has not yet adopted this independent tort of bad faith, but neither have
Missouri courts conclusively rejected it. This Comment will analyze, the
development of the bad faith tort in insurance law from its genesis to
its present status.3 It will also analyze the concomitant development of
Missouri law and conclude that the Missouri courts are in a position to
now adopt this cause of action. 4
• .- The new tort of "bad faith" applies to both third party excess judg-
ment claims and first party claims in every form of insurance available. 5
A third party excess judgment claim arises when an insured becomes
liable to a third party for his actions, but his liability is covered, in part
or in full, by a policy of insurance which he acquired for that purpose. The
third party claimant makes an offer to settle within the policy limits. The
insurer refuses to settle even though the liability of the insured is clear,
on the chance that he may win in court and be absolved from the duty
to pay anything. The parties go to court and the third party is awarded
a judgment against the insured far in excess of the policy limits. The in-
surer, who defended the action, hands over a check for the policy limits.
The third party then settles with the insured for what he can get of the
judgment, including an assignment of the insured's rights against the in-
surer. Finally, the third party or the insured sues the insurer for bad
faith refusal to settle within the policy limits and seeks the excess of the
judgment over the policy amount tendered.6
* 2. For an introductory discussion of the California tort, see Parks & Heil,
Insurers Beware: Bad Faith is in Full Bloom, 9 FORUm 63 (1973); Thornton &c
Blout, Bad Faith and Insurers: Compensatory and Punitive Damages, 12 FoRuM
699 (1977).
3. In Young v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., No. 10,480 (Mo. App.,
S.D., Aug. 2, 1979), an employee of Ozark Engineering Company alleged he
was injured while in the course of his employment. Defendant-insurer discon-
tinued disability payments to insured, prompting a suit by insured claiming
"defendant's refusal to pay further benefits . . . was intentional, malicious, and
designed to 'deprive plaintiff of his rights' under the Workmen's Compensation
Act and to force plaintiff to accept an inadequate settlement of his claim." Slip
op. at 2. While defendant's motion to dismiss was upheld on grounds not rele-
vant to this discussion, the court said, "reasonable research convinces us there is
no. sound reason why a first party bad faith action should not be entertained by
our courts in a proper case." Id. at 3.
4. For a good analysis of the bad faith tort action from a damages-oriented
perspective, see Kircher, Insurer's Mistaken Judgment-A New Tort?, 59 MARQ. L.
REv. 775 (1976); Note, The Availability of Excess Damages for Wrongful Refl sal
to Honor First Party Insurance Claims-An Emerging Trend, 45 FoRmH-m L. Rv.
164 (1976); Note, Increasing Liability for Refusal to Pay First Party Claims: Bad
Faith and Punitive Damages, 13 WAKE FoREsT L. REV. 685 (1977).
5. Although reported cases regarding all the various forms of insurance
policies are not available, language from the cases comprising the development
of the "bad faith" tort clearly indicates that the action applies to all contracts of
insurance. See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 573, 510 P.2d 1032,
1036; 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 484-85 (1973).
6. Generally the third party sues for the excess judgment and is joined by
1980]
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' First party claims, on the other hand, are those made directly by an
insured to his own insurer for a loss covered by his personal policy. The
insurer and its insured are the sole parties. These include routine claims
for fire loss, accident, disability, loss of life, and so forth.
Nearly every jurisdiction has accepted the "bad faith" theory in
third party cases. 7 Missouri expressly adopted this theory early in its de-
velopment.8 The present move is to extend this theory to, and provide
a tort remedy for, the first party "bad faith" cases. This movement is the
focus of the discussion to follow. The development in the third party ex-
cess judgment cases will be discussed only as it brings about and pre-
cedes the first party movement.9 Although the acceptance of the first
party "bad faith" tort cause of action will change the existing relation-
ship between the insurance industry and the public,'9 this change, like
the innovations in products liability, is one necessary to protect a society
which purchases insurance policies expecting peace of mind and freedom
from the ruinous aftermath of disaster. The public more than ever re-
lies on insurance and expects fiduciary-like treatment. This reliance must
be supported by effective sanctions should that reliance and the mutual
promises be breached in a "bad faith" or tortious manner.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE TORT OF BAD FAITH IN
FIRST PARTY CLAIMS IN CALIFORNIA
A. Third Party Excess Judgment Cases as the Genesis
The concept of "bad faith" in the performance of insurance contracts
by an insurer had its beginning in California in the third party excess
judgment or failure to settle cases. The seminal bad faith case was
Brown v. Guarantee Insurance Co.1 In that 1957 case, the insurer refused
even to consider a settlement because the amount demanded so closely
the insured who pleads for damages resulting from the bad faith acts of the in-
surer over and above the excess judgment, such as mental distress, punitives, and
the like. In some instances, however, the insured alone sues for the excess judg-
ment and the consequential damages resulting from the "bad faith" acts.
7. See authorities cited note 8 infra.
8. Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 228 S.W.2d 750 (Mo. 1950). See also Ponick,
Duty of Insurer with Respect to Settlement Offers, 26 J. Mo. BAR 284 (1970);
Tindel, Recent Developments in Insurer's Liability, 31 Mo. L. Rrv. 98 (1966);
Comment, Liability Insurer's Unreasonable Refusal to Settle Claim, 18 Mo. L. Rxv.
192 (1953) (noting Zumwalt).
9. For a discussion of continuing developments in the third party excess
judgment cases, see Bogert, Liability of Insurers in California Beyond Policy
Limits-Updated, 1978 INs. L.J. 135; Kelly, The Workable Sanction and Solution
in Excess Liability Cases: Strict Liability for Insurance Carriers, 1976 INs. L.J.
346; Comment, Expanding the Insurer's Duty to Attempt Settlement, 49 U. COLO.
L. REv. 251 (1978); Note, Insurer's Dilemma, 45 U.M.K.C. L. RIv. 147 (1976);
Annot., 63 A.L.R.3d 627 (1975); Annot., 63 A.L.R.3d 725 (1975).
10. See note 121 and accompanying text infra.
11. 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (1957) (automobile liability in-
surance; insured not notified of status of any settlement negotiations or advised
as to the protection of his rights or interests).
(Vol. 45
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approximated the policy limits that the carrier felt it had nothing to
lose by rejecting the demand. The court considered this attitude to be
evidence of callous disregard for the interest of the insured, and indicated
that in such situations there should be no requirement that the insured
pay the excess judgment before proceeding against the insurer. The court
stated that whether an insurer is "guilty" of bad faith for refusal to ne-
gotiate a settlement is a question of fact, and developed a list of con-
siderations relevant to that inquiry.12
Decided in the same year was Communale v. Trader's 6 General Insur-
ance Co.,13 in which the insurer refused to defend or settle a claim against
its insured on the ground that the policy did not cover the loss, although
the coverage was undebatable. The company was obligated to defend any
personal injury suit covered by the policy, but was given the right to
make any settlement it deemed expedient. This retention of complete
control over the settlement and litigation process by the insurer is a
standard provision in most contracts of insurance. In third party cases
this fact constitutes an important justification for placing the good faith
duty on the insurer. The insured is in a sense contractually prevented
from accepting or seeking a favorable settlement.
The Communales, the damaged third parties, obtained a judgment
against the insured. They then sued the insurer pursuant to the contract
and received a judgment for the excess over the policy amounts. The
Supreme Court of California affirmed the jury verdict and held that the
insurer wrongfully denied coverage to its insured, and failed to consider
the insured's interest in having the suit compromised by a settlement
within the policy limits. The court's holding was based on a principle
which now forms the basis of the bad faith movement: "There is an im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract that neither
party will do anything which will injure the right of the other to receive
the benefits of the agreement."' 4 The court went on to say that the in-
surer, in deciding whether a claim should be compromised, must take
into account the interest of the insured and give it at least as much
12. Id. at 689, 319 P.2d at 75. Considerations included:
[Tihe strength of the injured claimant's case on the issues of liability and
damages; attempts by the insurer to induce the insured to contribute to
a settlement; failure of the insurer to properly investigate the circum-
stances so as to ascertain the evidence against the insured; the insurer's
rejection of advice of its own attorney or agent; failure of the insurer to
inform the insured of a compromise offer; the amount of financial risk
to which each party is exposed in the event of a refusal to settle; the fault
of the insured in inducing the insurer's rejection of the compromise offer
by misleading it as to the facts; and any other factors tending to estab-
lish or negate bad faith on the part of the insurer.
13. 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958) (automobile liability insurance;
insurer claimed noncoverage but court held policy clearly applied).
14. Id. at 658, 328 P.2d at 200, citing Brown v. Superior Court, 84 Cal. 2d
559, 564, 212 P.2d 878, 881 (1949) (good faith in contracts principle equally ap-
plicable to contracts for insurance).
1980]
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consideration as it does its own interest.15 The court recognized a special
relationship between the insurer and its insured and imposed liability for
breach of that relationship. The California court noted that wrongful .re-
fusal to settle generally has been treated as a tort, but also sounds in
contract under an implied covenant. Where a case sounds both in contract
and tort, the plaintiff will ordinarily be free to elect between the two.'l
The form of action chosen affects the availability of compensatory and
punitive damages beyond the policy amount, as will be seen in later cases. 17
The landmark case in the development of third party claims was
C'isci v. Security Insurance Co.,1 s wherein the California Supreme Court
affirmed a $25,000 compensatory damage award for mental suffering in
addition to the excess judgment amount of $91,000. Mrs. Crisci, a seventy-
year-old widow, owned an apartment building which was covered by a
liability policy. Mrs. DiMare, a tenant in the building, fell through an
outside wooden staircase and was left hanging fifteen feet above- the
ground. As a result she suffered physical injuries and developed a severe
psychosis.
In her suit, the tenant alleged that Mrs. Crisci was negligent in
maintaining the staircase and asked for $400,000 in compensation. Mrs.
Crisci owned a $10,000 general liability policy; the plaintiff offered to
settle for $9,000. The insurance company was willing to pay only $3,000
even though it had reason to know that a jury could find for Mrs. Di-
Mare far in excess of its offer. The case went to the jury and a verdict of
$101,000 was rendered.
The insurer paid only the policy limits, refusing to pay the excess.
Mrs. DiMare attempted to collect $91,000 from Mrs. Crisci and reached
a settlement in which Mrs. DiMare received cash, property, and an assign-
ment of Mrs. Crisci's cause of action against the insurer. The settlement
15. 50 Cal. 2d at 659, 328 P.2d at 201. The court stated:
When there is a great risk of a recovery beyond the policy limits
so that the most reasonable manner of disposing of the claim is a settle-
ment which can be made within those limits, a consideration in good
faith of the insured's interest requires the insurer to settle the claim.
Its unwarranted refusal to do so constitutes a breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing..
See also Ivy v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 156 Cal. App. 2d 652, 320 P.2d 140 (1958).
16. 50 Cal. 2d at 663, 328 P.2d at 203 (citing Eads v. Marks, 39 Cal. 2d 807,
811, 249 P.2d 257, 260 (1952), for this rule of election).
17. In most jurisdictions, including Missouri, punitive damages are not
available in a breach of contract action. The types of compensatory damages avail-
able in such actions are circumscribed by a prerequisite showing of foreseeability
by the parties first recognized in Hadley v. Baxendale, 19 Ex. D. 341, 156 Eng.
Rep. 145 (1874). The requirement continues today. Williams v. Kansas City -Pub.
Serv. Co., 294 S.W.2d 36 (Mo. 1956). See also Comment, The Availability of Ex-
cess Damages for Wrongful Refusal to Honor First Party Insurance Claims-An
Emerging Trend, 45 FORDHAM L. Rxv. 164, 167 (1976); Comment, Insurance-
Increasing Liability for Refusal to Pay First Party Claims: Bad Faith and Punitive
Damages, 13 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 685, 690 (1977).
18. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
(Vol. 45
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caused Mrs. Crisci to become indigent; the change in her financial condi-
tion caused a decline in her physical health, hysteria, and suicide attempts.
Mrs. Crisd finally brought an action against the insurer.
Based upon the insurer's bad faith refusal to settle within the policy
limits, the court ordered the insurance company to pay the $91,000 ex-
cess verdict. Additionally, the court awarded Mrs. Crisci $25,000 for mental
suffering because, the court concluded, her insurance contract directly
concerned her comfort, happiness, and personal esteem. 19 As to the stand-
ard to be utilized in third party actions, the court measured bad faith
by an objective rather than subjective standard.20
The importance of Crisci in the development of the "bad faith" tort
is its inclusion of the mental distress damages in the recovery. The court
repeated the general rule of tort damages that "the injured party- may re-
cover for all detriment caused whether it could have been anticipated or
not."2 1 Mental suffering was defined as an aggravation of damages which
naturally ensues from the act complained of, and which in this connection
included nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, shock, humiliation, and in-
dignity, as well as physical pain. The court concluded that such awards
for mental distress are not confined to cases where the mental suffering
award is in addition to an award for personal injuries.2 2 The implications
of this holding for expanding insurers' potential tort liability are sig-
nificant.2 3
19. The court recognized that "among the considerations in purchasing li-
ability insurance, as insurers are well aware, is the peace of mind and security it
will provide in the event of an accidental loss." Id. at 434, 426 P.2d at 179, 58
Cal. Rptr. at 19. This consideration was deemed a protected property interest in
Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78(1970), discussed in text accompanying notes 28-30 infra. The interference with this
protected property interest was held by the Fletcher court to be an alternative
ground for recovery. See Keenan & Gillespie, The Insurer and the Tort of the
Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress: Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co.,
39 INS. COUNSEL J. 335, 339 (1972).
20. The court stated: "'[T]he test [of the insurer's good faith] is whether a
prudent insurer without policy limits would have accepted the [demand] ... "
66 Cal. 2d at 429, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16. See Note, The New Tort
of Bad Faith Breach of Contract: Christian v. American Home Assurance Corp.,
13 TuSA L.J. 605 (1978) (discussing the standard for bad faith).
21. 66 Cal. 2d at 433, 426 P.2d at 18, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 178.
22. "[D]amages for mental distress have also been awarded in cases where
the tortious conduct was an interference with property rights without any per-
sonal injuries apart from the mental distress." Id. at 433, 426 P.2d at 179, 58 Cal.
Rptr. at 19.
23. The potential tort liability arising from this decision is magnified not
merely by the holding that mental distress damages are recoverable where a pro-
tected property interest has been interfered with, but by the Crisci court's defini-
tion of mental suffering to include "nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, shock,
humiliation and indignity as well as physical pain." Id. at 433, 426 P.2d at
178, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 18. An insured may suffer many of these conditions as a
mere result of the occurrence of the event for which the insurance was obtained.
Because it would be virtually impossible for the trier of fact to segregate the
damages ensuing naturally from the event and those caused by the insurer's bad
1980]
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Further development in the third party excess judgment area estab-
lished that punitive damages are available against an insurer whose actions
are proven to be willful, malicious, and in serious disregard of an insured's
rights.24 Courts in California and other jurisdictions have refused, how-
ever, to hold an insurer strictly liable for failure to settle within the
policy limits.2 5 The importance these cases bear to first party cases is in
laying the basis of the tort of "bad faith" and in opening the way to
recovery of compensatory damages, including mental distress damages, and
punitive damages. The availability of punitive damages is notable be-
cause most states by legislation or judicial decree do not permit punitive
damages when the violated obligation arises from contract.26 An insurance
company cannot rely on such precedent where the action against it is
based on violation of an implied duty of good faith,2 7 i.e., one of tort.
B. Extension of the Tort into First Party Actions
Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Co.,2B in allowing a
first party recovery, drew heavily on the principles enunciated in Crisci,
but went further than Crisci by recognizing an independent tort recovery.
Both cases were grounded on a breach by the insurer of its implied duty
of good faith and fair dealing. However, while the recovery in Crisci was
in both contract and tort, the theory in Fletcher was entirely one of tort.
The Fletcher decision was weakened somewhat because the action was
based on the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, 29 and dis-
faith acts, the likely result of this dilemma is that the fact finder will not segre-
gate the damages, thus leaving the insurer, if found liable for some portion,
liable for all such damages.
24. Kulak v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 866 N.Y.S.2d 927 (App. Div. 1975),
rev'd on other grounds, 386 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1976). See cases cited in J. MCCARTHY,
PUNim DAMAGns IN BAD FArm CAsEs § 3.40 (1975). See also Annot., 85 A.L.R.
3d 1211 (1978).
25. Gibbs v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 544 F.2d 423 (9th Cir. 1976); Johan-
sen v. California State Auto. Assoc. Inter-Ins. Bureau, 15 Cal. 3d 9, 538 P.2d 744,
123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975); See Annot., 63 A.L.R.3d 627 (1975). For discussions
favoring strict liability for insurers, see Kelly, The Workable Sanction and Solution
in Excess Liability Cases: Strict Liability for Insurance Carriers, 1976 INs. L.J.
346; Schwartz, Statutory Strict Liability for an Insurer's Failure to Settle: A
Balanced Plan for an Unresolved Problem, 1975 DuKE L.J. 901.
26. 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages § 64 (1965) (general rule).
27. See Annot., 47 A.L.R.3d 314 (1973).
28. 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970) (allowing punitive damages
of $180,000 and compensatory damages of $60,000 where insurer canceled dis-
ability payments to father of nine children on basis of manufactured medical
evidence, offered negligible compromise settlement, and attempted to trick in-
sured into signing a release when cashing a check).
29. Id. at 394, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 88. See RESTATEENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
46 (1) (1965) ("[O]ne who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or reck-
lessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol45/iss1/10
INSURER'S REFUSAL TO SETTLE
cussion of the tort of bad faith as applied to these first party actions must
be considered dicta.3 0
In Richardson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp.,31 a California
appellate court ruled that a carrier of uninsured motorist coverage was
liable both in contract and in tort for amounts above its policy limits where
it in bad faith withheld payment for months after -it knew that the claim
was valid, and even tried to negotiate a better settlement after an arbitra-
tor's award. Liability was imposed for compensatory damages, attorney's
fees, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and exemplary damages.
As an action against an uninsured motorist carrier who for purposes
of the lawsuit occupies the position of the defendant, the Richardson case
is distinguishable from an actual first party suit by an insured against his
own insurer. It nonetheless provided support for the eventual extension of
the tort of bad faith to first party suits against insurers for failure to
settle.
C. Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co.-The Landmark Case for
Bad Faith in First Party Actions
The Gruenberg case,3 2 decided by the California Supreme Court one
year after Richardson, was the first case to apply "bad faith" to an in-
surance carrier in a first party action.3 3 The plaintiff alleged that following
30. The court stated:
Although it might be possible to rest our decision solely upon the
first holding, [intentional infliction of emotional distress,] we [rely upon]
the latter holding [bad faith-intentional interference with a protected
property interest] because we believe that it squares with the economic,
social and legal realities of the problem presented. The tortious conduct
in this case has resulted and could be expected to result, in both economic
loss (not alleged here) and emotional distress. The emotional distress
resulted, and could be expected to result, from both the immediate con-
duct of defendants and the economic losses caused by their conduct.
Indeed, in a case such as this, the invasion of economic interests might
well outweigh the direct invasion of emotional tranquility. The tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress is designed to redress pri-
marily invasions of the personal interest in emotional tranquility, not
economic losses, unless, of course, the economic losses result from the in-
tentionally caused emotional distress .... A rule placing the emphasis
where it belongs and permitting recovery of all proximately caused det-
riment in a single cause of action is more likely to engender public
respect ....
10 Cal. App. 3d at 402, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 94. Although the court's discussion does
not name the tort "bad faith," the underlying principles and basis are the same.
See Comment, The New Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract: Christian v. Ameri-
can Home Assurance Corp., 13 TULSA L.J. 605 (1978).
31. 25 Cal. App. 3d 232, 102 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1972).
32. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973). For a good dis-
cussion of Gruenberg and "bad faith," see Parks & Heil, The Tort of "Bad Faith"-
The Impact of Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co., 24 FED. INS. COUNSMr Q. 3
(1974).
33. 9 Cal. 3d at 573, 510 P.2d at 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr at 484. The Gruenberg
court recognized the existence of the independent tort of "bad faith," relying on
language from Communale progressively to Crisci, Fletcher, and Richardson.
1980]
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destruction of his property by fire, adjusters retained by his insurance
company informed local authorities that he had an excessive amount of
insurance, thereby implying a motive for arson. The police investigator
issued a felony complaint. Prior to the probable cause hearing on the
felony charge, the insurer requested the insured to submit to an examina-
tion under oath as required by the standard policy provisions. The in-
sured asked if the examination could be delayed until the criminal process
was completed to protect himself against self-incrimination, but the com-
pany denied this request.
Shortly thereafter, all criminal charges were dropped as a result of a
probable cause hearing, but the company continued to deny liability even
after Mr. Gruenberg agreed to an examination. Plaintiff sued Aetna,
charging that the request for examination under oath was made sdlely to
enable the insurer to gain further evidence to support the false implica-
tions of arson. As a proximate result of the insurer's conduct and ac-
companying insinuations, Mr. Gruenberg claimed to have suffered mental
distress in addition to the following economic losses: substantial loss of
earnings, losses due to the forced closing of his business, legal expenses to
defend suits brought by creditors whom he could not pay, and medical
expenses. The' trial court held that the plaintiff's complaint for "extra-
contract" damages failed to state a cause of action. The California Su-
preme Court reversed, holding that the plaintiff had stated a cause of
action, and that the duty of the insurer to act in good faith involved
a duty not unreasonably to withhold payments due under a policy. 4
Gruenberg indicated that agents and employees of an insurance
company could not be held personally subject to the implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing since they were not parties to the agreement
for insurance.8 5 The court further held that an insurer's duty is uncon-
ditional and independent of the performance of plaintiff's contractual ob-
34. We think that ... the implied-in-law duty of good faith and fair
dealing imposes upon a disability insurer a duty not to threaten to with-
hold or actually withhold payments, maliciously and without probable
cause, for the purpose of injuring its insured by depriving him of the
benefits of the policy.
Id. at 575, 510 P.2d at 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 486. This is the definitive state-
ment of acts which in the first party cases comprise bad faith on the part of in-
surers. For an informative article indicating that insurance counsel themselves
accept the implied-in-law duty of an insurer to act in good faith as settled law,
see Langdon & Sytsma, The Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing and the Pre-
Adjudicatory Role of the Insurance Company Advocate, 45 INS. COUNSEL J. 309,
312-13 (1978).
35. 9 Cal. 3d at 576, 510 P.2d at 1039, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 486. Accord, Egan v.
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 63 Cal. App. 3d 682, 133 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1976);
Iverson v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. App. 3d 168, 127 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1976); Hale v.
Farmers Ins. Exch., 42 Cal. App. 3d 681, 117 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974). The Gruenberg
court, though, did not consider the possibility that the agents could have committed
a separate tort arising from their acts in their respective capacities, since plaintiff
pleaded only a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
(Vol. 45
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ligations,3 6 and that a plaintiff could state a claim for mental distress
damages without alleging "extreme" or "outrageous" conduct by the de-
fendant.3 7
D. Post-Gruenberg Development of the Bad Faith Tort
One question left unanswered by Gruenberg was the standard which
would be utilized by the trier of fact to determine insurers' liability. In
the third party cases, recall that Crisci's test for imposing liability because
of failure to settle was the "prudent insurer" standard, an objective one.
In describing bad faith in the first party insurance context, courts have
used terms such as "deliberately, willfully,"38 "maliciously and without
probable cause, for the purpose of injuring,"39 "without probable cause," 4 3
and "unreasonably." 41 In using such conclusory legal terms, no method
for analysis or precise definition is revealed. One commentator has dis-
tilled two elements from a review of the bad faith non-payment of policy
benefits 'cases. The insured must allege and prove: (1) the absence of a
36. Defendant's duty... arises from a contractual relationship existing
between the parties .... While it might be argued that defendants would
be excused from their contractual duties (e.g. obligation to indemnify)
if plaintiff breached his obligations under the policies, we do not think
that plaintiff's alleged breach excuses defendants from their duty, im-
plied by law, of good faith and fair dealing. In other words, the in-
suier's duty is unconditional and independent of the performance of
plaintiff's contractual obligations.
9 Cal. 3d at 577, 510 P.2d at 1040, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 488. Accord, Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co. y. Altfillisch Constr. Co., 70 Cal. App. d 789, 139 Cal. Rptr. 91 (1977)(expressly holding that the implied covenant applied to acts of the insured as well).
37. 9 Cal. 3d at 579, 510 P.2d at 1040, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 488 (plaintiff need
not allege and prove extreme and outrageous conduct as RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 46 (1965) requires). The court based its holding on the fact that "we
are concerned with mental distress resulting from a substantial invasion of prop-
erty interests of the insured and not with the independent tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress." Id. at 580, 510 P.2d at 1041, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
In reaching its conclusion that the complaint was sufficiently pleaded since
plaintiff .had alleged substantial damages for loss of property apart from dam-
ages for mental distress, the court relied on and quoted at length the language
in Crisci concerning the recoverability of mental distress damages. The Crisci
rationale-for limiting recovery of damages for mental distress was stated as follows:
To permit recovery of such damages would open the door to fictitious
claims, to recovery for mere bad manners, and to litigation in the field
of trivialities .... Obviously, where ... the claim is actionable and has
resulted in substantial damages apart from those due to mental distress,
.,the danger of fictitious claims is reduced ....
66 Cal. 2d at 434, 426 P.2d at 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19. In both Crisci and Gruen-
berg, substantial damages apart from mental distress damages were pleaded. Accord,
Jarchowv. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917,. 122 Cal. Rptr. 470(1975). (discussing the substantial damage requirement). See also Parks & Heil,
Insurers Beware: "Bad Faith" Is In Full Bloom, 9 FORUM 63, 68-70 (1973).
38. Richardson v. Employer's Liab. Assur. Corp., 25 Cal. App. 3d 232, 239,
102 Cal. Rptr. 547, 552 (1972).
39. Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 401, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 78, 93 (1970).
40. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 575, 510 P.2d 1032, 1038,
108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 486 (1973).
41. Id. at 575, 510 P.2d at 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr, at 486.
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reasonable basis for denying benefits; and (2) the denial of benefits
while knowing or perhaps recklessly disregarding that such denial, was
without reasonable basis. 42 It would seem that an objective standard would
be utilized in determining the first element,4 3 while the second element
would require a subjective inquiry to determine intent.
A second question left open in Gruenberg is the nature of the de-
fendant's conduct needed to support a punitive damage award. In two
cases preceding Gruenberg, the availability of punitive damages in first
party cases had been established where the underlying cause of. action
was a conventional tort.44 Because no punitive damages were prayed for
in Gruenberg, it was not until a year after the Gruenberg decision .that
Silberg v. California Life Insurance Co.45 addressed the unanswered. ques-
tion. In Silberg, the California Supreme Court upheld an order for a new
trial because the evidence was found insufficient to support the, $500,000
punitive damages award returned by the jury for failure to pay a medical
insurance claim. 46 It was ruled that allegations necessary to create a sub-
42. Parks &: Heil, supra note 32, at 11.
43. "Crisci used an objective standard-the 'prudent insurer.' Since 'prudence'
does not seem relevant in the first-party context, the 'reasonable man' standard
would appear to be appropriate." Id. at 12 n.49. Some of the factors going to the
determination of reasonableness might include: (a) whether it was reasonable to
conclude that there had been a proper investigation of the claim before a de-
cision was made; (b) whether the result of such an investigation has been sub-jected to a fair and reasonable review and evaluation; and (c) based on the fore-
going, whether the decision to deny benefits was reasonable. Id. at 10.
The 'conclusion that intent is required is supported by Gruenberg; the court,
reviewing the complaint on demurrer, summarized its allegations chatging that
the insurer had:
Willfully and malicidusly entered into a scheme to deprive [the policy
holder] of... benefits .. .by falsely implying that he had a motive to
commit arson, and in that, knowing plaintiff would not appear for an
examination during the pendency of criminal charges against him, they
used his failure to appear as a pretense for denying liability undeir
the policies.
9 Cal. 3d 566, 575, 510 P.2d 1032, 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 486 (1973). For"a'case
where subjective intent was inferred from the wrongful withholding of benefits,- see
McDowell v. Union Mut: Life Ins. Co., 404 F. Supp. 136 (C.D. Cal. 1975)."
44. Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 78 (1970) (intentional infliction of emotional distress); Weatherbee v.
United Ins. Co., 265. Cal. App. 2d 921, 71 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1968) (constructive
fraud found where contract action on same facts would not have supported
punitive damages).,
45. 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974) (insurer's re-
fusal to pay accident claim during pendency of worker's compensation claim and
subsequent refusal to pay under exclusory clause held bad faith tort; $75,000
compensatory award affirmed but $500,000 punitive award reversed).-
46. The court reasoned:
It does not follow that because plaintiff is entitled to compensat-
tory damages that. he is also entitled to exemplary damages. In order
to justify an award of exemplary damages, the defendant must be guilty-
of oppression,, fraud or malice . . . .He must act with intent td vex,
injure or annoy, or with a conscious disregard of the plaintiff's rights.. :. "
While we have concluded that defendant violated its duty of good: faith
[Vol: 45
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missible case under the bad faith tort theory are, standing alone, not
enough to support a punitive damage award. There must be further al-
legations of oppressive acts accompanied by the necessary intent, express
or implied.4 7
Most recently, the California Supreme Court addressed its newly
created tort of bad faith in Neal v. Farmers Insurance Exchange.4 8 There
the defendant failed to make prompt payment of the insured's claim under
an uninsured motorist provision. In affirming the trial court's award of
compensatory and punitive damages, the court attempted to explain the
terms "good faith" and "bad faith," noting again a distinction between
the showing necessary to sustain a "bad faith" finding and that necessary
for a punitive award incidental to the "bad faith" cause of action:
The terms "good faith" and "bad faith," as used in this
context ... are not meant to connote the absence or presence of
positive misconduct of a malicious or immoral nature-considera-
tions which... are more properly concerned in the determination
of liability for punitive damages. Here we deal only with the
question of breach of the implied covenant and the resultant li-
ability for compensatory damages .... Good faith performance
or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed
common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations
of the other party; it excludes (from consideration) a variety of
types of' conduct characterized (in other contexts) as involving
"bad faith" because they violate community standards of decency,
fairness or reasonableness.4 9
In Neal, the defendant insurance company utilized a training course
for its claims adjusters specifically to groom them for the actions here
condemned. This fact was emphasized as strongly indicative of bad faith;
the defendant's challenged actions were part of a conscious course of con-
duct grounded in established company policy. 50
and fair dealing, this alone does not necessarily establish that defendant
acted with the requisite intent to injure plaintiff.
Id. at 462, 521 P.2d at 1110, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
47. The Silberg court further noted:
Although the evidence was in conflict on the issue whether it was
customary in the insurance industry to make payments under the policy
in these circumstances and the order granting a new trial declared
there was insufficient evidence of such a custom, the failure to establish
common practice in this regard cannot absolve the insurer. The scope of
the duty of an insurer to deal fairly with its insured is prescribed by
law and cannot be delineated entirely by customs of the insurance in-
dustry.
Id. at 462, 521 P.2d at 1109, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
48. 21 Cal. 3d 910, 582 P.2d 980, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1978) (insurer's pro-
longed refusal to make payment under uninsured motorist provision despite un-
favorable opinion by insurer's attorney held made in bad faith even though all
payments were made before suit following arbitration decision; $748,000 punitive
award affirmed on basis of insurer's net worth).
49. Id. at 921 n.5, 582 P.2d at 986 n.5, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 395 n.5 (citations
omitted).
50. Id. at 923, 582 P.2d at 987, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
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III. EXPANSION OF THE BAD FArrH TORT
FROM CALIFORNIA TO OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Other jurisdictions soon followed the Gruenberg rationale in cases
involving similar fact situations. The first such case was decided by an
Illinois intermediate appellate court in 1975 in Ledingham v. Blue Cross
Plan.51 Ledingham underwent surgery due to an abrupt physical dis-
order and submitted timely claims for medical and hospital bills under
her health and accident policy. The defendant-insurer refused payment on
the ground that Ledingham's condition fell under a policy exclusion for
pre-existing illnesses; Ledingham's doctor stated he could not tell whether
the illness had existed prior to issuance of the policy. At the trial the
insurer produced no other evidence substantiating its claimed defense, but
appeared to deny the insured's claim solely because of her doctor's un-
certainty concerning the source of the illness. In affirming the award
of compensatory damages, the court specifically recognized the new tort
given birth in Gruenberg.5 2
The Illinois court was influenced by that state's previous recognition
of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress as a basis for
award of extra-contractual compensatory damages in insurance cases. 53
Ledingham went on, however, to disapprove a previous Illinois holding
which did not allow punitive damages in such cases. 54 The court dis-
tingu ished Illinois cases holding punitive damages inappropriate in con-
tract ases, saying that those cases involved traditional contract situations
between private parties of reasonably equal bargaining power. "In the
court's view, these situations did not involve the relative vulnerability of
one party as is quite often presented in insurable matters." 55 The'court
suggested for Illinois a framework allowing both the cause of action and
puniti ,e damages.5 6 Two recent intermediate appeals cases *in Illinois
51v 29 IlL. App. 3d 339, 330 N.E.2d 540 (1975), ree'd on other grounds, 356
N.E.2d 75 (1976).
52. Id. at 349, 330 N.E.2d at 548.
53. Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1972).
54. Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961).
55.' .Lev, Punitive Damages in First Party Insurance Claims; Reaching the
Age of Maturity, 83 CASE & CoM. 48, 54 (1978).
56.- The framework as suggested by the court was as follows:
1) Punitive damages may not be awarded generally in an action on a
contract.
2), However the breach of a contract itself may constitute an 'unusual
case where an independent willful tort will be found.'
3) In the life and health insurer-insured relationship there is a duty
upon both parties to act in good faith and deal fairly with the other
party to the contract.
4) Breach of this duty implied by law is both a breach of the contract
and a tort.
29 I1. App. 3d at 350, 330 N.E.2d at 548. The court did not call the new tort
specifically by its Gruenberg title, i.e., "bad faith." Instead, it chose to call it, as
did the Fletcher court, a "tortious interference with a protected property in-
terest." 10 Cal. App. 3d at 410, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93. It did so, specifically avoid-
[Vol. 45
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have refused to follow LedinghamP57 and the Illinois Supreme Court has
yet to xesolve the split.
A federal court applying Florida law followed suit in Escambia Treat-
ing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 58 reasoning that an insured pur-
chases insurance and not an unjustified court battle when he enters
into an insurance contract. The development of the first party action in
California was traced and the court concluded that since Florida rec-
ognized the good faith duty in the third party cases, it should be extended
to the handling of claims of a company's own insured.59 It also indicated
that in the proper case punitive damages would be appropriate, although
noting that a different quantum and type of proof than mere breach of
contract would be required for an award of punitives.60
The. Oklahoma Supreme Court recognized the tort of bad faith in
Christian. v. American Home Assurance Corp.61 The plaintiff received
injuries in the scope of his employment, leaving him totally and perma-
nently disabled. He filed proper proof of disability and made demands
for the full amount of his $50,000 disability policy. The insurer neither
paid the claim nor stated a reason for withholding payment. During the
subsequent trial of Christian's breach of contract action, it became ap-
parent that the insurer "did not have, or had never had, [any] defense
to [the insured's] daim."' 2
The insured then filed a separate action asserting tort liability for the
insurer's bad faith refusal to process his claim, alleging that the insurer's
acts. were intentional, malicious, and in total disregard of its duty to pay
his .claim. The Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded that plaintiff had
stated a cause of action and specifically recognized "a distinct tort based
upon an. implied duty of the insurer to act in good faith and deal fairly
with its insured." 63
ing the intentional infliction of emotional distress theory, so that punitive dam-
ages could be recovered.
57. Urfer v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 60 Ill. App. 3d 469, 376 N.E.2d 1073
(1978); Debolt v. Mutual of Omaha, 56 Ill. App. 3d 111, 371 N.E.2d 373 (1978).
58, 421 F. Supp. 1367 (N.D. Fla. 1976).
59. Id. at 1370-71.
60. Id. at 1371; Campbell v. Government Employees Ins., 306 So. 2d 525
(Fla. .197-4); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Butchikas, 313 So. 2d 101 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App., 1975).
61. .577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1977). See Note, The New Tort of Bad Faith Breach
of Contract; Christian v. American Home Assurance Corp., 13 TULSA L.J. 605
(1978)..,
62. 577 P.2d at 900. Defendant's refusal to pay the claim was at all times
unknown to the plaintiff.
63. Id. at 907 n.l. The court cited several cases from the growing number
of jurisdictions which now recognize a cause of action in tort against an in-
surer for a bad faith refusal to compensate its insured for a loss covered by the
policy. Included were: United Serv. Auto Ass'n v. Werley, 526 P.2d 28 (Alas.
1974); John Hancock Life Ins. Co. v. McNeill, 27 Ariz. App. 502, 556 P.2d 803
(1976); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Peterson, 91 Nev. 617, 540 P.2d
1070 (1975); State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Clifton, 86 N.M. 757, 527 P.2d 798 (1974).
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The Christian case can be distinguished from the California cases in
two respects. First, in the California cases, either the bad faith conduct
of the insuring companies was outrageous, or the resulting consequences
to the insured were extreme. In Christian, however, the insurer's conduct
was substantially more subtle-a mere refusal to settle promptly. Second,
the court found as a source of the duty to deal in good faith with its in-
sured not only the contract but also the Oklahoma Insurance Code.64
The court stated: "This statutory duty imposed upon insurance com-
panies to pay claims immediately, recognizes that a substantial part of
the right purchased by the insured is the right to receive the policy
benefits promptly." 65 Thus the defendant was found to be in direct -vio-
lation of a duty imposed both judicially and legislatively.
Another portion of the Oklahoma opinion addressed the defeidant's
claim that third party excess judgment cases limited the availability of
the new tort to situations where the insurer represents the insured in the
settlement of third party claims. This is because, the insurer argund, a
special fiduciary obligation is created where the insurer assumes the
complete defense, of the suit against the insured to the point that he is
expressly prohibited from participating therein. This relationship is
thought to create a greater obligation on the part of the insurer to act
in the best interests of the insured, an obligation not imposed'ii most
first party cases. Christian disagreed, however, and followed the philosophy
of the California court in Fletcher, holding that the duty attaches to all
relationships established by the insurance industry because of its quasi-
public nature, the insured's lack of bargaining power, and the justifiable
reliance placed on the insurer by the insured.6 6 In both the third party
and first party cases, the court reasoned, the insurance company is in a
64. The court noted:
Our Insurance Code requires insurance companies to make im-
mediate payment of claims. Title 36, O.S. 1971 § 4405 A.8, requires the
following provision to be included as a standard clause in all individual
accident and health policies:
TIME OF PAYMENT OF CLAIMS:
Indemnities payable under this policy for any loss ... will be paid
immediately upon receipt of due written proof of such loss.
While this provision would not deter an insurance company 'from
refusing payment on a claim that it had reasonable cause to believe
was factually or legally insufficient, it does express the intent of our
legislature to impose upon insurance companies an obligation to pay:a
valid claim on a policy promptly.
The obligation of an insurance company ... on a disability policy
is not for the payment of money only, it is the obligation to pay the
policy amount immediately upon receipt of proper proof of loss
and to deal fairly with its insured ....
577 P.2d at 903-04. This language is important since Missouri's vexatious refusal
to pay statute, supra note 1, arguably indicates the same legislative intent which
could form a basis for adopting the "bad faith" tort.
65. 577 P.2d.-at 903.
66. Id. at 902 .(quoting Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App.
3d 376, 403, 89-Cal. Rptr. 78, 95 (1970)).
(Vol. 45
16
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol45/iss1/10
INSURER'S REFUSAL TO SETTLE
position to cause the insured great emotional difficulties, either by re-
fusing to settle a potentially ruinous claim or by refusing to recompense
the insured for an already distressing injury. Both situations justify the
imposition of liability for the tort of bad faith.6 7
Without citing the California cases, New York adopted the Gruen-
berg rationale in Frizzy Hairstylists, Inc. v. Eagle Star Insurance Co. 6 8
The insured suffered a fire loss in her beauty parlor and submitted a
$4,870 claim to the defendant under her fire insurance policy. Defendant,
approximately six months after the fire, offered her $1,250. The insured's
business had limited capital and could not continue without prompt pay-
ment of the claim; she eventually was evicted by her landlord due to the
resultant failure of her business. The defendant's only defense for non-
payment of the claim was an accusation of arson, although no competent
supporting evidence could be produced. The basis for the accusation
was third-hand hearsay which hinted at arson, but did not implicate the
plaintiff-insured.69
The New York court found that the defendant acted with malice in
"low baling" plaintiff's claim, forcing plaintiff out of business, reiuiring
plaintiff to sue and wait years for collection, and necessitating the sharing
of its award with an attorney. The court awarded the plaintiff punitive
damages, relying primarily on the public policy in New York evidenced
by statutory provisions7 0 and related regulations71 which required insur-
ance companies to process claims fairly and promptly and prohibited un-
fair claim settlement practices. Following these legislative pronounce-
ments and a previous case,72 the New York court imposed a duty of good
faith73 on insurers, suppliers of what they saw as a virtual necessity of
modern life.74
67. See Note, supra note 61. The writer concluded that the existence of a
"special" relationship between an insured and the insurer, giving rise to a duty
or responsibility on the part of the insurer to deal in good faith with the in-
sured, is a requisite element of the new tort of "bad faith." Id. at 613-16.
68. 89 Misc. 2d 822, 392 N.Y.S.2d 554 (Civ. Ct. 1977).
69. Defendant's sole witness, its claims adjuster, testified that someone at
the New York Board of Fire Underwriters had told him that the fire marshall's
report supported arson and that he had confirmed the fact by his own observa-
tions of the premises.
70. N.Y. INs. LAw §§ 40-d, 272, 273 (McKinney 1966 & Supp. 1978).
71. 11 N.Y.C.R.R. § 216.6 (a) (1973).
72. Cappano v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 28 App. Div. 2d 639, 280 N.Y.S.2d 695
(1967).
73. The obligation of good faith was defined as "the duty to consider, in
good faith, the insured's interest as well as its own when making decisions as to
settlement." Frizzy Hairstylist, Inc. v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., 89 Misc. 2d 822, 824,
392 N.Y.S.2d 554, 556 (Civ. Ct. 1977).
74. This public policy was necessitated, the court stated, by the recognition of
the tremendous power wielded by the insurer:
Very few New Yorkers are immune from purchase of insurance..
From the "cradle to the grave" we attempt to protect ourselves and oqr
loved ones. In some instances it is mandated -by statute. You can't drive
-an automobile in New York (and in most other states) unless you pur-.
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The New York court further observed that although under state law
the insurance department had standing to enforce regulations, a private
person injured by violation of those regulations would be left without an
effective remedy.7 5 Implication of a tort cause of action was essential to
the public policy of forcing insurance companies to deal with constimers
in good faith.
Other jurisdictions also have adopted the bad faith tort originated in
Gruenberg,70 and still more have reached the transitory Fletcher stage
where liability is based on a previously accepted tort theory such as in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference with a pro-
tected property interest, fraud, or deceit.77 The most beneficial effect of
this increasingly accepted cause of action would be the institution of an
in terrorem influence on the insurance companies, causing them to police
themselves in a desire to avoid liability.7 8
chase an auto insurance policy. To the small businessman it is essential-
not 'having fire, liability and other business coverages would spell the
"death knell" for the victim of a casualty. A huge industry-the insurance
industry-has been spawned as a result of tremendous need and demand
for multitudinous forms of insurance coverage.
Id. at 823, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 555.
75. The Missouri statutes contain provisions regulating unfair practices and
frauds in the insurance industry. See V.A.M.S. §§ 375.930-.948 (Supp. 1979);
RSMo § 375.445 (1978) (company operating fraudulently or in bad faith). As in
New York, the remedies under these statutes are penal in nature and are en-
forced by the administrative agency which regulates the insurance industry in
the state. In Missouri this is the Department of Consumer Affairs, Regulation and
Licdnsihg of the Division of Insurance. The agency, pursuant to the above statu-
tory provisions, may issue cease-and-desist orders, assess a fine not to exceed 51,000
payable to the school fund (RSMo § 374.280 (1978)), or suspend an insurer's
certificate. Before the agency may find a violation subject to the remedies above,
the conduct alleged must have been frequent enough to constitute a business
practice as determined by the agency (departmental discretion as to whether
"business practice" exists-no inter-departmental guidelines). I
Because the monetary remedy does not run to the insured, the conduct
must constitute a business practice. The cease-and-desist order has proven in-
effective and the remedies provided are inadequate to redress the wrongs done
the individual claimant; they have little in terrorem effect on the industry as
a whole.
For an indication of legislative intent that the standards of good faith and
fair dealing be followed in Missouri, see 4 C.S.R. § 190.060 (Mo. 1978) (con-
stituting the regulations issued under RSMo § 375.445 (1978)), setting forth the
proscribed unfair claims settlement practices. The form chosen for setting out
these unfair claims practices in many instances indicates what the legislature
interprets as fair, and prescribes what claims practices are preferred.
76. See, e.g., Grand Sheet Metal Prod. Co. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 34
Conn, Super. 46, 375 A.2d 428 (1977); Diamond v. Pennsylvania Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 247 Pa. Super. Ct. 534, 372 A.2d 1218 (1977); United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co. v. Peterson, 91 Nev. 617, 540 P.2d 1070 (1975).
77. See, e.g., Vernon Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 264 Ind. 599, 349 N.E.2d
173 (1976); Amsden v. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co., 203 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa
1972); Annot., supra note 27.
78. Faced with the prospect of paying punitive damages such as were awarded
in a jury verdict of $5,000,000 (on appeal reduced to $2,500,000) in Egan v. Mutual
of Omaha Ins. Co., 63 Cal. App. 3d 659, 133 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1976), the insurance
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IV. THE NEw TORT IN MISSOURI
A. Missouri's Vexatious Refusal to Pay Statutes79
Under Missouri's vexatious refusal to pay statutes, if an insurer fails
or refuses for thirty days after demand "to make payment under.. . terms
and provisions of the contract of insurance, and . . . [such] refusal was
vexatious,"8 0 a court or jury may award damages in addition to the amount
due under the provisions of the contract. These damages may not exceed
twenty percent of the first $1,500 of loss, ten percent of the loss in excess
thereof, interest thereon, and a reasonable attorney's fee. Section 375.420
defines "vexatious" as "without reasonable cause or excuse." 8' Because
this statute is penal in nature and must be strictly construed,8 2 it has
been held that refusal to pay is not vexatious if the defendant has, any
reasonable ground to deny payment.83 The burden is on the plaintiff-
insured to prove that the refusal to pay was willful and without reason-
able cause.8 4 In most cases, the insurer is able to refute a lack of reasonable
cause, often relying on broadly worded escape clauses in the policy itself.8 5
In Groves v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co.,8 6 the Missouri
Supreme Court set out a strict test of both objective and subjectiye bad
faith on the part of the insurer to establish a vexatious refusal to pay.B7
industry may concern itself with measures to avoid such awards. See Bogert,
Liability of Insurers in California Beyond Policy Limits-Updated, 1978 INS. L.J.
135 (example of proposed industry reactions).
79. See statutes cited note 1 supra.
80. RSMo § 375.296 (1978).
81. The text of § 375.420 is set out at note 1 supra.
82. See Basset v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., 565 S.W.2d 823 (Mo. App.,
D.K.C. 1978); Kay v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 548 S.W.2d 629 (Mo. App., D. St.
L. 1977); State ex rel. United States Fidelity & Guar. Go. v. Walsh, 540 S.W.2d
137 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976).
83. See Mechanic's Tool Sales, Inc. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 564 S.W.2d
557 (Mo. App., D.K.G. 1978); Meyer v. M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co., 543 S.W.2d 822
(Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976). See also Hay v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 551 S.W.2d 954
(Mo. App., D. Spr. 1977) (defining "vexatious" as without reasonable or probable
cause or excuse).
84. Hay v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 551 S.W.2d 954 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1977).
85. See Howarth v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 34 (8th Cir.. 1973);
Sommer v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 449 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. 1970); Bechtolt
v. Home Ins. Co., 322 S.W.2d 872 (Mo. 1959); Bouligny v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 179 S.W.2d 109 (St. L. Mo. App. 1944).
86. 540 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. En Banc 1976).
87. The court stated:
[T]he penalty for vexatious refusal of an insurance company to pay
the claim of its insured should not be imposed unless the facts and cir-
cumstances surrounding the company's refusal to pay show that the re-
fusal was wilful and without reasonable cause or excuse, as the facts
would have appeared to a reasonable person before trial. An insurance
company may question and contest an issue of fact relating to its lia-
bility if it has reasonable cause to believe, and does believe, that there
is no liability under its policy and that it has a meritorious defense.
The mere fact that the trial judgment is adverse to a defendant's con-




Smith: Smith: Tort Liability for an Insurer's Bad Faith Refusal to Settle:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1980
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
In Hounihan v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.,8 8 the plaintiff met
this burden. Following an investigation of a fatal fire, the insurance com-
pany denied liability because of "foul play" and "suspicious circumstances"
and the possible motive of strained marital relations after the insured's
wife and child had moved out of the house which burned. No evidence
was adduced at trial to support this theory; in fact, the defendant's own
eyewitness refuted it.89 In affirming the vexatious refusal to pay award,
the court of appeals observed that an unsubstantiated suspicion of arson
does not justify an insurer's refusal to pay, even if supported by a later in-
vestigation. In Hounihan, it was noted, the defendant was still seeking
facts to justify its denial of liability one year after the fire.9 0
It has also been deemed a vexatious refusal to pay where the insurer
has made a settlement offer even though the policy claimed under was a
"valued fire insurance policy" which provided a set formula of stated
value less depreciation for determination of the compensable loss.91 There
was no possible dispute as to the amount due under the policy, and an
offer to settle for a different amount was violative of the statute.
It is apparent from the cases under the Missouri vexatious refusal to
pay statutes that the conduct of the insurer in question is the same
as that creating liability under the tort of "bad faith." Differences in re-
medial value arise because the focus in a vexatious refusal to pay case is
on the insurer's activity, not on the injury to the insured. This is due
to the penal nature of the action 92 and the fact that damages are fixed
by statute. Recovery thereunder is inadequate because the insured will not
be compensated for his economic losses or mental distress if they exceed
the statutory limits. In addition there can be no recovery of punitive or
exemplary damages which would result in an effective deterrent from
bad faith conduct, nor is there an incentive for the insurer and the industry
as a whole to deal in good faith with the people they insure.
Although the absence of cases recounting the effects of "bad faith" ac-
tivities on insureds can lead to an illusion that the problem is nonexistent
in Missouri, it should be recalled that these cases have been brought ex-
clusively under the statutes and not under an independent tort theory.
In fact these consequences do occur, but Missouri plaintiffs remain without
a remedy.
B. The Missouri Development of the Tort of Bad Faith Refusal
to Settle Within the Policy Limits-Excess Judgment Cases
The Missouri courts early recognized a duty of good faith owed
by insurance companies to their insureds in third party settlement cases.
88. 523 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1975).
89. Id. at 175.
90. Id. at 176. See Cohen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 444 S.W.2d 498
(St. L. Mo. App. 1969).
91. Citizens Discount & Inv. Corp. v. Dixon, 499 S.W.2d 231 (Mo. App.,
D. St. L. 1973).
92. See cases cited note 82 supra.
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Two. appellate cases, St. Joseph Transfer & Storage Co. v. Employers' In-
demnity Corp.,93 and McCombs v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.,9 4 laid the
foundation for the tort cause of action in this area. The McCombs opinion
adopted. language from a New York case:
[I]t would be a reproach to the law if there were no remedy for
so obvious a wrong as was inflicted upon this plaintiff. His rights,
as we have said, go deeper than the mere surface of the contract
written for him by the defendant. Its stipulations imposed obliga-
tions based upon those principles of fair dealing which enter into
every contract. Even the defendant has invoked this implied ob-
ligation of good faith and fair dealing not expressed in the terms
of its written contract .... 95
The duty of good faith was recognized as arising not from the direct
language of the insurance contract, but from the "relation of the parties,
one of whom has reserved the exclusive control over the decision to settle
or to litigate."96
The Missouri Supreme Court recognized the third party tort of bad
faith in 1950 in Zumwalt v. Utilities Insurance Co. 97 The court found
93. 23 S.W.2d 215, 220 (K.C. Mo. App. 1930). The court stated:
Good faith requires that the insurance company do nothing to the
prejudice of the assured which is not beneficial to itself ....
If the evidence showed the case was one where, under the con-
cqded facts and upon settled principles of law, it would have been
the duty of the court to direct a verdict for plaintiff for an amount
in excess of the insurance, then we would be inclined to hold that the
insurance company acted in bad faith in refusing to settle for an
amount within the limits of the policy ....
The case was brought on a theory of negligent failure to settle, and the court
held that the insurer was not negligent in considering its own interest as well
as that of the insured's. Significantly, the court refused to hold that in fulfilling
its duty to act with due care, an insurer must consider the interest of the in-
sured to the exclusion of its own. However, a foundation was laid for a good
faith requirement not to prejudice an insured when in doing so the insurer would
receive no benefit. This recognition that the insurer has some duty to con-
sider the interest of the insured as well as its own was called "good faith."
94. 89 S.W.2d 114 (St. L. Mo. App. 1936) (refusal to settle for policy
limits because of company procedure even where insurer's own attorney ad-
vised that judgment would certainly be adverse and in excess of policy limits;
held, bad faith refusal to settle).
95. Id. at 121, quoting Brassil v. Maryland Cas. Co., 210 N.Y. 235, 237, 104
N.E. 622, 624 (1914). After reviewing several cases from other jurisdictions con-
cerning he bad faith issue, the McCombs opinion went on to state, "The courts
are not in agreement in holding the insurer liable for negligence in refusing to
settle, but there is no disagreement with respect to the insurer's liability where
bad faith appears. In such a case all the courts, without exception . . .hold the
insurer liable...." 89 S.W.2d at 121.
96. 89 S.W.2d at 121. This special relationship between the insurer and the
insured has been said to be the genesis of the duty of the insurer to deal in good
faith and a requisite element of the new tort of "bad faith." Note, supra note 61,
at 613.
97. 360 Mo. 362, 228 S.W.2d 750 (1950). Burneson was injured by an over-
head garage door on the defendant's premises. Defendant's insurer had issued a
liability policy covering the premises which gave it sole control over litigation
and settlement. Burneson filed an action seeking $40,000 for his injuries. De-
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that the insurance company's bad faith refusal to settle within the policy
limits was predicated on "intentional disregard of the financial interest
of the insured in the hope of escaping the responsibility imposed upon
it by its policy."98 Zumwalt, like McCombs,9 9 placed emphasis on the in-
surer's exclusive power to settle or litigate the case. This factor is always
fendant's policy was limited to $10,000, but his insurer refused to settle for
$8,500 because it had reinsured $5,000 of the policy amount, and the reinsurer
refused to entertain such a possibility. During the trial, Burneson again offered to
settle, this time for $6,500, but defendant's insurer refused. The trial resulted
in a judgment for Burneson for $15,000; the insurer paid $10,000 and the de-
fendant-insured paid $5,000 plus interest. Insured, now plaintiff, filed suit against
his insurer on the grounds of its bad faith and negligence in failing to settle the
previous lawsuit within the policy limits. Plaintiff recovered $7,012.77.:actual
damages, the excess plaintiff had paid over the policy limits.
For further discussion of the third party tort of bad faith in Missouri, see
Ponick, Duty of Insurer With Respect to Settlement Offers Within Policy Limits,
26 J. Mo. BAR 284 (1970); Seiler, Work of Missouri Supreme Court for..1950-
Insurance, 16 Mo. L. REv. 369 (1951); Comment, Liability Insurer's Unreasonable
Refusal to Settle Claim, 18 Mo. L. REv. 192 (1953) (noting Zumwalt in extensive
discussion). For a later case in accord with Zumwalt, see Landie v. Century Indem.
Co., 390 S.W.2d 558 (K.C. Mo. App. 1965), noted in Tindel, Recent De'velop-
ments in Insurer's Liability, 31 Mo. L. Rnv. 98, 100 (1966).
98. 360 Mo. at 371, 228 S.W.2d at 754. Plaintiff in the Zumwalt,.case also
sought to recover attorney's fees, penalties for vexatious delay, and puniives. The
trial court refused to submit this question to the jury and plaintiffs appealed
from that action. Regarding the applicability of the vexatious refusal to pay
statute, the supreme court stated:
We think this section applied only to actions ex contractu to' re-
cover for refusal to pay under the terms of a policy of insurance. If de-
fendants had not paid the limit of their policy on the judgment ob-
tained by [plaintiff], then this section would be applicable. But that, is
not the case. This action is a tort action. It is not an action to recover
"any loss under a policy" of insurance. It is true it grew out of a- con-
tract, a policy of insurance.
Id. at 373, 228 S.W.2d at 756.
On the issue of punitive damages, the court said that before such damages
can be awarded there must be evidence that the defendant "maliciously, willfully,
intentionally, or recklessly injured the plaintiffs," but that this showing had not
been made in this case. The court concluded that, at most, defendant did not
act in good faith in handling the Burneson case.
[D]efendant looked after its own interest only, while under the law it
owed a duty to have considered the Zumwalt Company's interest. .If, in
the effort to do this, its own interest conflicted with those of respondeilt
[insured], it was bound under its contract of indemnity, and in* iood
faith, to sacrifice its interests in favor of those of respondent.... This the
defendant failed to do.
Id. at 374, 228 S.W.2d at 756 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). This
represents a clear expansion of the insurer's duty of "good faith" from the early
cases formulating such a duty. Compare this statement with the quotation from St.
Joseph Transfer & Storage Co., set out at note 93 supra.
99. The Zumwalt court noted that the question of a "bad faith" tort theory
presented a case of first impression for the Missouri Supreme Court, but that it
had been addressed by the Court of Appeals, St. Louis District, in McCombs. The
Zumwalt opinion noted McCombs' finding of a consensus among the jurisdictions,
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present in cases of first party claims since the insurer controls the funds
on which the insured relies. 100
Second, the court implied that there is no exclusive remedy for a
wrongful refusal of an insurance company to settle a claim. In.Zumwalt
it was indicated that in some cases both contractual actions and actions
under the vexatious refusal to pay statutes might lie.101 Since in third
party cases like Zumwalt the policy limits will almost always be exhausted
and the contract will have been discharged, the simultaneous use of both
contract and statutory theories would more likely come up in a first party
case. In such a case, a tort cause of action should also be allowed, with
the plaintiff able to elect among the alternatives.' 0 2
In Zumwalt, although the evidence was found insufficient to sustain
a punitive damages claim even with the finding of bad faith on the part
of the defendant, the court indicated that punitive damages would be
available in third party excess judgment cases upon a showing of malicious,
100. Id. In the third party cases, the insured's hands are tied because the
power to defend or settle has been contractually taken away from him. He
can only sit and wait to see what his insurer will do. In. first party cases, the in-
sured is also helpless because his ability to economically or psychologically sur-
vive a disaster is in the hands of the insurer who controls the funds which pro-
vide the needed help to "pick up and go on." Being in this dependent position
strengthens the insurer's ability to procure a favorable settlement from the vic-
tim or deny the claim altogether. In both types of cases, the insured's economic
well-being is at the mercy of the insurer.
101. See note 98 supra.
102. In a third party situation, an insured would have the option of an or-
dinary action for breach of contract or an action under the vexatious refusal
to pay statute only if the insurer failed to pay at least the policy limits and the
judgment against the insured exceeded that amount. See Zumwalt v. Utilities
Ins. Co., 360 Mo. 362, 228 S.W.2d 750 (1950). See also Craig v. Iowa Kemper Mut.
Ins. Co., 565 S.W.2d 716, 720 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1978), where the court stated:
These statutes were enacted, not as additional recovery, but that the
amount due under the insurance policy shall be paid without arbitrary
refusal or recalcitrant delay by the insurer. By the terms of Sec. 375.420
only those actions ex contractu and not ex delicto-even where the tort
arises from contract-may recover penalties. (Citations omitted.)
This remedy was meant to be a recovery on the contract, a penalty for
unnecessary delay in performing that contract. The tort of "bad faith" 9n the
other hand is a distinct recovery intended to compensate the insured for the
tortious behavior of the insurer. The penalty should be available in all cases
where the insurer vexatiously and unreasonably delays payment of the proceeds.
This would include cases where the insured is actually harmed very little or
none at all, but punishment of the insurer is appropriate. In cases where the
blatant acts of the insurer cause serious economic, psychological, or social injury
to the insured, however, the tort of "bad faith" with its damages should be
available. If courts or the legislature are concerned about a "double recovery,"
the availability of the "bad faith tort" theory could be conditioned on a waiver
of the statutory action.
Regarding the relationship of the tort and statutory actions, the Craig court
held, "we need not consider whether the remedy of § 375.420 precludes the tort
cause of action... because, for reasons given there was no relationship of insurer
and insured-essential to the tort recovery as pleaded-at the time of the bad
faith conduct alleged." 565 S.W.2d at 722.
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willful, intentional, or reckless infliction of injury upon the insured.10 3
Under a contract cause of action in Missouri, as in the majority of juris-
dictions, 10 4 such damages are otherwise unavailable; the defendant's con-
duct must be shown to constitute an independent tort.105
C. The Extension of "Bad Faith" into First Party Cases
In Dyer v. General American Life Insurance Co.,10 the plaintiff
brought suit under an individual accident policy claiming punitive dam-
ages for alleged tortious breach of duty of good faith in failure to pay.
The court recognized the viability of such a claim as undecided in Mis-
souri and discussed the bad faith tort in the third party context, but
resolved the case without deciding the first party bad faith tort question. 10 7
The Dyer court in dicta opined that plaintiff's allegations of de-
fendant's acts would not have constituted bad faith should such an action
have been recognized. This finding was based on an earlier case holding
that an insurer may, without penalty, insist on judicial determinations of
open questions of fact or law determinative of the insurer's liability if
such insistence is made in good faith.108 Dyer also indicated that a puni-
tive damage award would require not merely bad faith acts but a show-
ing that the defendant's intent was malicious, willful, intentional, or
reckless. For this proposition the court cited Zumwalt.'0 9
Most recently, in Craig v. Iowa Kemper Mutual Insurance Co.,"1 0
103. See note 98 supra.
104. See 25 C.J.S. Damages § 120 (1966).
105. See Williams v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 294 S.W.2d 36 (Mo. 1956).
106. 541 S.W.2d 702 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976) (after payment of disability
benefits for 24 months and opinion by insurer's doctor that insured was totally
and permanently disabled, insurer ceased payments upon learning that insured
had worked for 8 months subsequent to injury).
107. The court stated:
'Wjhether the plaintiff before us is totally and continuously dis-
abled ... is a matter upon which reasonable minds might differ. Under
such circumstances, we cannot say that the insurer's decision to deny lia-
bility amounts to bad faith. This is so in spite of any medical evidence
indicating the plaintiffs disability is total and permanent. If there is an
"open question of fact or law determinative of the insurer's liability, the
insurer, acting in good faith, may insist on a judicial determination of
such questions without being penalized therefore."
541 S.W.2d at 705 (citations omitted).
108. Cox v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 520 S.W.2d 76, 81 (Mo. App., D.K.C.
1974).
109. 541 S.W.2d at 706. The court also cited Zumwalt in discussing the bad
faith tort in third party actions for failure to settle. Id. at 704.
110. 565 S.W.2d 716 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1978). This suit arose as a result of a
collision in March 1970, which took the life of the infant son of the plaintiffs,
the Craigs. The infant had been a passenger in the Ward automobile driven by
Mrs. Craig's brother who was uninsured. Welborn, the other driver, was in-
sured by Allstate. At the time of the collision, the plaintiffs were insured under a
liability policy issued by defendant Iowa Kemper, which provided uninsured
motorist coverage of $10,000 for a single injury or death. The plaintiffs notified
the defendant of their claim under that provision. Defendants offered plaintiffs
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plaintiff-insured sued for satisfaction of an uninsured motorist provision.
He included a count for the vexatious refusal to pay penalty and a count
for actual and punitive damages for tortious breach of fiduciary duty to
deal with policy holders in good faith. The Craig court interpreted the
insurer-insured relationship in the uninsured motorist context so that no
liability was found under the vexatious statute, and no fiduciary relation-
ship was found to have existed when the bad faith acts occurred. The
nominal insured was characterized as a third party claimant and the un-
insured motorist was viewed as the actual insured under the court's inter-
pretation of the relationships in issue. The court concluded that there
existed an adversary, not fiduciary, relationship between the insurer and
insured. 1 :' Because the duty to deal in good faith arises not merely from
consent and contract but from the nature of the relationship, where there
is no fiduciary relationship there is no duty, and where there is no duty
there is no tort.1 12 The court did discuss the bad faith tort, however, stat-
ing that:
[G]eneral jurisprudence recognizes that a policy of insur-
ance imports the utmost good faith by the insurer to perform ac-
cording to its terms. This principle extends to imply a covenant of
good faith and fair dealing from every contract of insurance. The
$7,500 to settle their claim against Ward. In December, 1972, a jury returned a
verdict of $23,500 for plaintiffs against both Ward and Welborn.
Within 30 days of judgment, defendants offered the plaintiffs $9,500 in full
settlement of their claim under the uninsured motorist coverage. The plaintiffs
originally demanded the full $10,000 coverage, but after counsel discovered that
the Iowa Kemper policy covered more than originally anticipated, the plaintiffs
withdrew the offer to settle.
Plaintiffs brought a petition in four separate counts against defendant. The
first two counts were for policy amounts plus interest. Count III was for a
vexatious refusal to pay penalty and count IV sought recovery for actual and
punitive damages for tortious breach of duty by the insurer to deal with the
plaintiffs as policy holders in fairness and good faith.
The trial court found for plaintiffs on the first two counts, for the defendant
on count III, and for the defendant on count IV (the bad faith allegation) by
summary judgment. The appeal from that summary judgment constitutes the
main subject of interest here.
111. The court explained:
[T]o prove a claim under the Part IV [uninsured motorist] coverage the
nominal insured must show the legal liability of the uninsured motorist.
The insurer, for its part, in effect insures the uninsured motorist to the
extent of the policy limits and so seeks to exonerate the uninsured motorist
of liability to avoid payment to the policy insured. Put simply, the nominal
insured and the insurer under this coverage are placed in an adversary
relationship. Once the liability of the uninsured motorist has been ad-judicated, the policy insured and the insurer are restored, not merely to
their actual relationship, but to that of creditor and debtor as well. The
claim then becomes a loss under the policy and vexatious refusal of the in-
surer to pay the loss becomes actionable under § 375.420.
Id. at 721 (citations omitted). Although this discussion was to show why the
vexatious statute did not apply, it would be equally applicable to the first party
tort.
112. Id. at 723-24.
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law thereby assumes the agreement of an insurer not to injure
the right of an insured to receive the benefits of the contract. The
courts apply this principle of an implied [obligation to act in]
good faith [by whatever designation] to give an insured a remedy
both on the policy-ex contractu-and in tort.
As applied to a first party claim on the policy, the covenant
facilitates an insured to recover the benefits payable directly to
him by the contract.11 3
In a footnote the court conceded that Missouri law does not recognize
the implied covenant in first party claims, but gives redress by "canons
of construction."11 4 As to first party claims by the insured on a contract,
the court said that the vexatious refusal statute created a substantive
cause of action for a penalty against the insurer for unreasonable delay
without good faith. "Thus, our law not only requires an insurer to meet
the reasonable expectations of the insured on the contract, but" by" the
statute shifts the expense of delay in payment of the claim onto the' in-
surer.""15 In discussing the statutory and contractual claims the court used
language favorable to the recognition of the bad faith tort in first party
cases, but then in unsupported dicta18 went on to say that "the tenor of
our law suggests otherwise.""17 This' conclusory statement may have been
made without consideration of the great extent to which the development
of Missouri law parallels that of California or of the language in recent
Missouri cases similar to that which appeared in California prior to
Gruenberg's adoption of the bad faith tort."18
V. CONCLUSION
The insurance industry has grown into such a monolithic institution
so intricately woven into our everyday lives that it is quasi-public in
nature." 9 Contracts of insurance are, for the typical consumer, adhesion
118. Id. at 722 (emphasis in original).
114. Id. at 722 n.5.
115. Id.
116. Because the court determined that bad faith had not caused any injury
to the plaintiffs, discussion of the existence of a bad faith tort cause of action
was unnecessary to the holding. Id. at 724.
117. Id. The court did not support this statement with citation of Missouri
cases.
118. Compare Hounihan v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 523 S.W.2d 173 (Mo.
App., D. Spr. 1975) and Dyer v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 541 S.W.2d 702 (Mo.
App., D. St. L. 1976) with Fletcher v. Western Nat1 Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App.
3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970) and Richardson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp.,
25 Cal. App. 3d 232, 102 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1972) (cases indicating the same.gen-
eral treatment of the insurer's good faith obligations in the first party context).
119. In 1977, in the United States, there were in force 390 million policies
of life insurance valued at 2,582.8 billion dollars. Total sales in 1977 were 392.9
billion dollars. In Missouri by the end of 1977 there were 8,631,000 policies of
life insurance in force at a value of 56,285 million dollars. In the health in-
surance field in 1976, there was generated in the United States 24,265 million
dollars in premium income. For property and liability insurance for the same year,
the premiums totalled 60,813 million dollars. Included in that figure was 3,982
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contracts because of the overwhelming bargaining power of the industry.
Complete reliance is placed upon an insurer for peace of mind and for
security from ruinous disaster. These factors form the basis for implication
of a duty of good faith and fair dealing.
Some jurisdictions have legislatively determined the statutory penalty
adequate as an exclusive remedy to the insured, finding the tort unneces-
sary.'2 0 When the damage suffered by an insured is nominal, this is true.
But, given an extreme situation, a statutory remedy with fixed percentage
of loss damages and attorneys' fees can be wholly inadequate. What is
needed is not a penalty but rather compensation for the insured who
loses his business, his home, or his health because he believed the insurer
would do as promised.
The extension of the bad faith tort into the first party area will not
be without repercussions to plaintiffs and defendants, the bar, and the
courts. These concern all phases of the insurer-insured relationship, but
particularly the discovery techniques and claims handling practices used
by both plaintiffs and defendants. As for the courts, they will have to
settle on either a general standard or one applicable on a case-by-case
basis to determine what conduct of an insurer constitutes "bad faith."
These effects will be manageable because they have been considered and
experienced, and have been analyzed in a considerable body of writing; 121
the tort has been widely accepted, and case law exists to explain its
nuances. The new tort should be adopted by Missouri courts.
LELAND C. SMITH II
million dollars in fire insurance premiums. In 1976, 76.8% of the population
was covered under a hospital benefit plan and 93.2%' "hadl major' medical ex-
pense coverage.
The"insurance industry in 1977 totalled 351.6 billion dollars in assets and
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